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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VICTOR PRICE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
A Utah Corporation, and
DAVID ZSERAI,

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 20568

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
POINT I

WHETHER THIS COURT ON APPEAL IS
PRECLUDED FROM HEARING ISSUES
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A
POST JUDGMENT MOTION.

POINT II -

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY IT'S DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL WHICH WAS BASED ON
GROUNDS OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
OF CAUSATION TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
CASE.

POINT III -

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DENYING
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
WHICH WAS BASED ON DENIAL OF
DEFENDANTS REQUEST TO FURTHER
VOIR DIRE THE JURY WITH REGARD TO
POSSIBLE PREJUDICE.

(1)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
R e s p o n d e n t c l a i m e d damages f o r i n j u r y s u f f e r e d
a r e s u l t of Appellants'

as

negligence.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
T r i a l was h e l d t o a j u r y November 27 and 2 8 , 1 9 8 4 .
J u d g m e n t i n t h e amount o f $ 1 4 0 , 7 1 5 . 0 0 p l u s i n t e r e s t

and

c o s t s was e n t e r e d upon v e r d i c t o f t h e j u r y i n f a v o r o f
Respondent.

(Addendum 1 ) .

A p p e l l a n t s moved f o r

notwithstanding the verdict or,
f o r new t r i a l .
oral

judgment

in the a l t e r n a t i v e ,

motion

F o l l o w i n g s u b m i s s i o n o f memoranda and

a r g u m e n t b y t h e p a r t i e s t h e t r i a l j u d g e r u l e d by memorandum

d e c i s i o n denying Appellants1 motions.
appeal followed said

(Addendum 8 ) .

This

decision.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
R e s p o n d e n t s e e k s an o r d e r from t h i s
t h e j u d g m e n t and o r d e r o f t h e t r i a l

court

affirming

court.

STATEMENT OF FACT
Plaintiff-Respondent,
t o a s Mr. P r i c e ,

Victor Price, hereinafter

c l a i m e d damages a g a i n s t

referred

Defendants-Appellants

U t a h Power & L i g h t Company and D a v i d Z s e r a i ,

hereinafter

r e f e r r e d t o as U . P . & L . f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y s u f f e r e d by Mr.
P r i c e as a r e s u l t o f U.P.& L . f s n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n o f a
(2)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a piece of heavy equipment which frightened the animal
which Mr. Price was riding causing it to bolt.

In an

attempt to control the animal Mr. Price braced himself on
the saddle with his right arm, pulled the rein with his
left to turn the mule into a circle.

Mr. Price suffered a

nerve injury resulting in loss of use and shriveling of his
right arm. (Trans. 62, 67, 68, 81). Jury trial was held
November 27 and 28, 1984. The jury decided that U.P.&L.was
907o negligent in the operation of heavy equipment on
September 15, 1981. (Addendum 1).

Negligence of U.P.& L. is

not raised as issue on appeal and therefore will not be
treated by Respondent in Statement of Fact. The jury also
found that U.P.&.L.'s negligence was the proximate cause of
damages sustained by Mr. Price.

(Addendum 1).

Prior to his injury Mr. Price had been a self-employed
rancher for 45 years.

(Trans. 45). Mr. Price had been

treated through the years by chiropractors.

Mr. Milton K.

Thayn, chiropractor, first saw Mr. Price in January 1978.
Mr. Price was complaining of a stiff neck.

(Trans. 207),

Dr. Thayn took x-rays, (Trans. 208), and gave a grip test
(Trans. 210) finding weakness in both arms but found the
right arm had more strength than the left.

(Trans. 211).

He diagnosed a thorasic sprain (Trans. 211) meaning injury
to a muscle, ligaments and connective tissue.

(Trans. 212).

Following treatment which ended May 8, 1978 (Trans. 215) Dr.
(3)
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Thayn n o t i c e d a general improvement in a l l conditions
previously noted i n Mr. P r i c e .

(Trans. 215).

Dr. Thayn

did not feel Mr. P r i c e ' s treatment r e q u i r e d r e f e r r a l to a
n e u r o l o g i s t and gave no t e s t s for n e u r o l o g i c a l damage other
than the grip t e s t s e a r l i e r r e f e r r e d t o .

(Trans. 216).

Dr.

Thayn t e s t i f i e d t h a t in h i s opinion subsequent trauma would
aggravate Mr. P r i c e ' s

condition (Trans. 216) and t h a t a

r i d e on a b o l t i n g mule such as
injury to the neck.

Mr. P r i c e had, would cause

(Trans. 217).

Mr. Price saw Ronald B. Sanders, Chiropractor in July
1978 (Trans. 154) t e s t e d Mr. P r i c e ' s neck flexion and found
i t l i m i t e d (Trans. 158-159) and examined x-rays previously
taken (Trans. 161) and diagnosed t i g h t neck muscles. (Trans. 163).
Dr. Sanders t r e a t e d Mr. P r i c e with soft t i s s u e and spinal
manipulation (Trans. 163) u n t i l September 1979 (Trans. 166)
and did not see him again u n t i l August 20, 1981 when he
t r e a t e d Mr. Price by p u l l i n g arid s t r e t c h i n g h i s neck. (Trans. 167)
Similar treatment was given four times between August 20 and
September 9, 1981.

(Trans. 168).

On September 16, 1981 Mr. Price saw Dr. Sanders, t o l d
him of the incident on the mule.

(Trans. 169).

At no time

during h i s treatment of Mr. P r i c e did Dr. Sanders feel t h a t
h i s condition was such as to r e q u i r e medical treatment u n t i l
December 1981 (Trans. 175) when the condition complained of
on September 16, 1981 had not responded to treatment and
(4>
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d e t e r i o r a t i o n of Mr. P r i c e ' s r i g h t hand was noted. (Trans. 176).
Dr. Sanders t e s t i f i e d t h a t a severe s t r a i n or twist could
aggravate the weakness in the c e r v i c a l spine.

(Trans. 177).

Appellant c i t e s two h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n s as proof that Mr. Price
had a p r e - e x i s t i n g neurological or c e r v i c a l problem in
support of his argument t h a t something o t h e r than the
incident of September 15, 1981 cause Mr. P r i c e ' s

injury.

The facts are as follows:
In 1968 Mr. Price was admitted to Carbon Hospital for
treatment of fracture of r i b s , l e f t chest and contusion of
l e f t leg as per discharge summary and discharge record.
(Addendum 2, Defendant Exhibit 24).

There i s no evidence of

any injury to neck, spine, arm or head.

(Addendum 2, Defendant

Exhibit 24).
In 1977 Mr. Price was again h o s p i t a l i z e d .

He was t r e a t e d

for multiple contusions, l a c e r a t i o n of s c a l p and broken l e f t
arm.

There was "no deformity" of back and no neurological

problems noted.

(Addendum 3, Defendant Exhibit 23).

His

r i g h t arm was not t r e a t e d , nor any injury noted, he was not
t r e a t e d for any injury to neck or back, although x-ray was
taken of c e r v i c a l , t h o r a s i c and lumbar spine.

(Addendum 4,

Defendant Exhibit 23).
Mr. Price was admitted into t h e h o s p i t a l again in
January 1981 for p r o s t a t e surgery.

Condition of h i s back was

noted as "no deformity" and neurological condition was noted
(5)
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as "reflexes are normal."

(Addendum 5, Defendant Exhibit 25).

This examination was only nine months p r i o r to the incident
on Spetember 15.
Other than A p p e l l a n t ' s repeated reference to injury
to Mr. P r i c e ' s r i g h t arm t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t h i s r i g h t
arm was injured, diagnosed as injured or t r e a t e d for injury
p r i o r to September 15, 1981.
Dr. Demman, who was Mr. P r i c e ' s t r e a t i n g physician and
who r e f e r r e d Mr. Price to Dr. Guafin, Neurologist, died s h o r t l y
before t r i a l .
testify.

Dr. Demman was obviously not a v a i l a b l e to

Dr. Gaufin's r e p o r t s were admitted i n t o evidence

by s t i p u l a t i o n of Counsel.

(Trans. 66).

Mr. Price t e s t i f i e d

t h a t immediately a f t e r t h e i n c i d e n t with the mule he was sore
through the shoulders and neck (Trans. 55) and the next day
he could t e l l he was h u r t i n g , g e t t i n g sore and f e e l i n g dizzy.
(Trans. 56).

He t e s t i f i e d t h a t two or t h r e e days l a t e r he

aaw Dr. Sanders because h i s hip was h u r t i n g r e a l bad, h i s
neck was h u r t i n g , h i s chin was numb and h i s hand was numb.

Dr.

Sanders r e f e r r e d Mr. Price t o Dr. Demman, who r e f e r r e d him t o
Dr. Gaufin.
On November 1 1 , 1984 U.P.& L. requested a j u r y t r i a l in
the case on appeal herein (Addendum 6 ) .

Bias was ainticipated

by U.P.& L. as evidenced by t h e i r questions on v o i r d i r e .
(Trans. 31, 32, 42).

There was no motion for change of

venue made by U.P.& L.

From a panel of 38
"

( 6 )

'

:

( T r i a l Record),

" • " - • ' •
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a jury was selected from the first twenty names called.
OTrial Record p. 124). Four employees or spouses of
employees of U.P.& L. were excused by the court prior to
the initial call for fourteen jurors.

(Trans. 5, 6).

Juror Wilson was excused by the court because he felt
his experiences with U.P.& L. through Emery Mining would
possibly bias his decision.

(Trans. 33). His excuse was

a result of voir dire question proposed by counsel for
Appellant.

(Trans. 32).

Juror Jensen was excused because she felt she would be
biased in favor of a farmer.

(Trans. 32).

Juror Leamaster was excused by the court because her
brother was involved in litigation against U.P,& L,

(Trans. 20,

21).
Juror Lake was excused by the court because his association
with Mr. Price could possible influence him,

(Trans. 17).

Juror Gregersen was excused by the court because he
was a neighbor of Mr. Price.

(Trans. 36 37).

Juror Cox was excused by the court because she knew Mr.
Price had been an employee of U.P.& L. at the time of
incident and had heard about the case.

(Trans. 37).

Jurors were called from the panel to replace the six
excused for cause as they were excused.
challenged no juror for cause.

County for U.P.& L.

Coimsel for U.P.& L. did not

object to the Court's denial of his request to ask if
(7)
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connection between U.P.& L. and Emery Mining layoffs would
affect the jurors impartiality.

(Trans. 42). Counsel for

U.P.& L. at no time objected to the panel's size nor
construction.

Counsel for U.P.& L. passed the jury for cause

(Trans. 43). The final panel of fourteen was constituted as
follows:
1.

Hannert - An employee laid off from Emery Mining.
(Trans. 10).

2.

Burnside - Husband laid off IPP.

(Trans. 11).

3.

Nelson - Employee of Emery County Road Department,
(Trans. 11, Defendant prempt #2, Addendum 7).

4.

Justesen - An employee of Emery Mining.

(Trans. 12).

5.

Humphry - Employee of Emery County Road Department.
(Plaintiff's prempt #1, Addendum 7).

6.

Adams - Coal miner at Plateau Mine.

7.

Shorts - Hardware store owner.

8.

Spigarelli - School teacher, husband disabled Emery
Mining.

(Trans. 13).

(Trans. 12)..

(Trans. 12).

Counsel for U.P.& L. directed

voir dire to her regarding bias.

(Trans. 42, Plaintiff prempt

#2, Addendum 7).
9.

Staley - Employed Emery Mining.

(Trans. 13).

10. Fuller - Employee of Nelson Construction.

(Trans. 13,

Plaintiff prempt #3, Addendum 7).
11. Allred - Employee of Emery Mining.
12. Rasmussen - Retired pipe fitter.

(Trans. 18).
(Trans. 21).

(8)
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13.

Ekker - Employed Green River Medical Center;
husband, self-employed.

14.

(Trans. 37, 38).

Hayward - Laid off Emery Mining.

(Trans. 38,

Defendant prempt #1, Addendum 7).
Of the eight jurors selected, the only jurors connected
with U.P.& L. or Emery Mining were three jurors who were
presently actively employed by Emery Mining Company.
At the close of Plaintiff's case, Defendant moved for
a directed verdict on the sole ground of insufficiency of
the evidence with respect to negligence.
Motion was denied.

(Trans. 110). Said

(Trans. 112).

On January 21, 1985, U.P.& L. filed Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or, alternatively, Motion for
New Trial.

(Trial Record p. 176-177).

The issue of

insufficiency of evidence of causation was raised for the
first time in Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
The issue of insufficiency of evidence and jury bias were
raised for the first time as issues in Motion for New Trial.
Memoranda of Points and Authorities in support of said
motions was filed by U.P.& L. (Trial Record p. 180-215).
Plaintiff's objection and supporting Memorandum was filed
January 30, 1985 (Trial Record p. 219-238).

Argument was

heard by the court on February 13, 1985 (Trial Record p. 239)
and the court took the matter under advisement; entering its
findings in Memorandum Decision entered February 28, 1985,
(9)
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( T r i a l Record p . 240-244, Addendum 8 ) .

Said decision

d e n i e d Motion for Judgment N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g V e r d i c t and
Motion f o r New T r i a l .

This appeal

followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issues raised by Appellant on appeal were not
timely raised before the trial court, therefore, this court
is precluded from hearing the appeal.
There was, as the trial court found, sufficient evidence
of causation to support the jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff.
There was no error in the trial court's denial of
Defendants request

that voir dire include an additional

query regarding prejudice against Defendant and, if there
was error, it was harmless.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER THIS COURT ON APPEAL IS PRECLUDED FROM HEARING
ISSUES RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A POST JUDGMENT MOTION.
Appellant requested the jury, anticipated bias, made
no motion for change of venue, did not object to the courts'
denial of its request to voir dire the jury regarding bias,
as a result of lay offs at Emery Mining, and challenged no
individual juror for cause.

It is obvious that any possible

jury bias was known to Appellant upon conclusion of voir dire.
(10)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant passed the jury for cause.
Appellant did not raise the issue of insufficiency of
the evidence with regard to causation at any time during
the trial.

Appellants' Motion for Directed Verdict rested

solely on the issue of negligence; the only issue of law
reserved for later determination.

(URCP 50, Addendum 9).

It is obvious that the issue of insufficiency of evidence,
if any, would have been apparent to Appellant at the close
of Plaintiff's case.

It was not raised.

In post judgment proceedings, Appellant raised the issues
of jury bias and sufficiency of the evidence regarding
causation for the first time; in its Motion for New Trial.
This court has held in Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
682 P2d 832 (Utah 1984):
In order to preserve a contention
of error on appeal, the party claiming
error in admission of evidence must
raise the objection to the trial
court in clear and concise terms and in
a timely fashion calculated to obtain
a ruling thereon. Where there was no
clear and definite objection on the
basis of hearsay, that theory cannot now
be raised on appeal. Squibb did raise
a hearsay objection after judgment was
entered in the case. However, issues
raised for the first time in postjudgment motions are raised too late
to be review on appeal. Therefore, we
are precluded from addressing this
assertion of error on the merits,
at 837, citing.
Barson deals with timely objection to admissibility of
T.

U.R.E. 4; Cook Assocs". Inc. v. Warnick, Utah, 664 P2d 1161
(1983). State v. Malmrose, Utah 649 P2d 56 (1982).
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P2d 1040
(Utah Digitized
1983).
" W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
~ Clark
~ Law School,
~ ~ BYU.
by the Howard
Machine-generated
OCR,
may
contain
errors.
(11)

evidence.
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in a case like the case
at bar wherein a Motion for New Trial on the grounds of
insufficiency of the evidence was made after a jury verdict,
finding that the issue in question involved a Constitutional
right, (eminent domain) the court agreed to hear the matter,
but said:
It is the general law that:
"... a question or objection may not
be raised for the first time on a
motion for new trial, and a party
may not speculate on the verdict by
failing to raise a matter as to which
he has knowledge and then raise it for
the first time on a motion for a new
trial.11 66 C.J.S. New §13b, p.104.
In our own state, we have the following
pronouncement from our Supreme Court:
"Parties may not sit by and allow error
which is not fundamental, to be committed
without protesting and asking the trial
court to correct the error at the time,
and then later, when the judgment goes
against them, ask for a new trial on that
ground.11 (Emphasis Added). Southern
Arizona Freight Lines v. Jackson,^48 Ariz.
590, 518, 63 P2d 193, 197 (1936).2
In the case of Agranoff v. Morton, 340 P2d 811 (1959),
a case involving failure to take exception to jury instruction,
the Washington Court said:
It is the duty of counsel for all
parties to promptly call the court's
attention to any error in the trial.
Counsel may not secretly nurture an
error, speculate upon a favorable
verdict, and then, in the event it
T.

Deer Valley Industrial Park Dev. & L. Co. v. State, Ariz. 5,
Ariz. App. 150, 424 P2d 192, (1967). ~~~~
™"~
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is adverse, bring forth the error
as a life preserver on a motion for
a new trial.
The supreme court of Pennsylvania
recently held:
"... The rule has been stated over
and over again that a party may not
remain silent and take his chance
on a verdict and then, if it is
adverse, complain of some inadequacy
which could have been quite easily
corrected. See Susser v. Wiley,
1944, 350 Pa. 427, 39 A.2d 616; Rastmus
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1949, 164 Pa.
Super. 635, 639, 640, 67 A.2d 660;
Stadham Co. v. Century Indemnity Co.,
1950, 167 Pa. Super. 268, 275, 74 A.2d
511...,f Bodine v. Boyd, 383 Pa. 525
119 A.2d 54, 276.
This specific problem was dealt with
in Weinrob v. Heintz, 346 111. App. 30,
41, 104 N.E. 2d 534, 539, as follows:
"...An objection to the submission of the
issue of fact to the jury must be made
before the case is given to the jury.
After the case has been submitted to
the jury and a verdict has been
returned it is too late to make or
for the court to rule on the objection.
Such objection, made for the first time
on a motion for a new trial, is of no
avail. A party is not permitted to lie
by and speculate on his chances for a
verdict and then raise objections which
should have been raised during the trial.
Goldschmidt v. Chicago Transit Authority,
335 111. App. 461, 467, 82 N.E.2d 357."
Respondent's counsel made no request for
a direction on the issue of liability.
Had such a request been seasonably made,
it would have been granted without objection.
Had it been denied, respondent would have
been in a position to urge it upon a motion
for a new trial and, if necessary, then upon
appeal. But he may not remain silent when
(13)
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it is time to speak, and then urge
it for the first time on a motion
for a new trial.
The issues raised on this appeal were or should have
been apparent to Appellant at least by mid-trial.
not raised in motion for directed verdict.

They were

Appellant chose

to await the jury verdict, which did not weigh in his favor,
before raising the issues by way of Motion for New Trial, the
same issues now raised on appeal.
Respondent raised the issue of untimeliness at hearing
on February 13, 1983 on Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict and Motion for New Trial.

(Trial Record).

The

issues raised by Appellant were untimely raised before the
trial court and preclude consideration by this court.

(14)
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POINT II
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IT'S
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHICH WAS BASED ON GROUNDS
OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION TO ESTABLISH
A PRIMA FACIE CASE,
This court repeatedly held that the trial court has
extensive discretion when granting or denying a new trial on
the grounds of sufficiency of the evidence.
The established standard for appellate review provided:

,

...This court cannot substitute
its discretion for that of the
trial court, and this court will
not interfere with such rulings,
unless the abuse of, or failure to
exercise, discretion on the part
of the trial judge is clearly shown.
If, upon examination of the evidence
as disclosed by the record, it is apparent
that there is a substantial conflict
of evidence as to material issues of
fact in the case relative to which
the insufficiency is alleged, this court
must hold as a matter of law that no
abuse of discretion is shown.
... If the evidence, taken as a whole,
be reasonably susceptible of opposite
conclusions as to the existence or
nonexistence of an ultimate fact
depending upon inferences to be drawn
therefrom, or the weight to be given to
the testimony of this or that witness,
or set of witnesses, we must conclusively
presume the fact to be such as will support
the ruling which we are called upon to reviewj
but if, after giving due consideration to
the fact that the trial judge is better able to
weigh conflicting evidence, the evidence be
such nevertheless as to impel but one reasonable
conclusion, and that as to a fact adverse
to the ruling,
it would be our duty as an
(15)
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appellate court to so declare,
notwithstanding there might be
some conflict in the evidence.
[Citations Omitted].3
This rule was further refined by this court in the
case of Nelson v. Trujillo, 647 ?2d 730 (Utah 1982) as
follows :

Where the t r i a l court has denied the
motion for a new t r i a l , i t s decision !w i l l
be sustained on appeal i f t h e r e was " an
e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s for t h e j u r y ' s decision
. . . " The t r i a l c o u r t ' s denial of a
motion for
a new t r i a l w i l l be reversed
only i f n t h e evidence to support the
v e r d i c t was completely lacking or was
so s l i g h t and unconvincing as to make
the v e r d i c t p l a i n l y unreasonable and
unjust. t f McCloud v. Baum, Utah, 569 P2d
1125, 1127 (1977); Polles"chev Transamerican
Insurance Company, 27 Utah 2d 430, 497
"

P2d 236 (1972J.
The t r i a l court in i t s Memorandum Decision (Addendum
8, p.3) c i t i n g Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 27 Ut.2d 419,
497 P2d 28 ( 1 9 _ ) , found:
. . . [ T ] h e court f e e l s t h a t t h e r e was
s u f f i c i e n t evidence presented from
which reasonable minds could conclude
that there is a greater probability that
the conduct r e l i e d upon was a proximate cause
of P l a i n t i f f ' s r e s u l t i n g i n j u r i e s .
When, a t t r i a l , t h e r e e x i s t s a j u r y question with regard
Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Company, 27 Utah 2d 430,
497 P2d 236 (1972); See a l s o , Egbert & Jaynes v . R. C. Tolman
Const., 680 P2d 746 (Utah 1984); Schmidt v. Intermountain
Health Care, I n c . , 635 P2d 99, (Utah 1981), c i t i n g , Smith v.
Shreeve, Utah, 551 P2d 1261 (1976), Lee v. Howes, 548 P2d ~
619 (1976) ; Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P2d 530 (Utah 1984),
c i t i n g Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P2d 710 (Utah 1982) and
Lembach~. Cox 639 P2d 197 (Utah 1981) ; Smith y, Vivcich,
8UAR5, (Utah 1985), c i t i n g Bundy v Century Equipment Company
s l i p . o p . 18270, f i l e d November 2, 1984, McCloud v. Baum, $69
P2dDigitized
1125by the(Utah
Howard W.1977).
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to an ultimate fact in issue it is not error for the trial
court to deny a Motion for a New Trial based on a claim of
4
insufficiency of the evidence.
The trial court below found there was sufficient evidence
to support the jury's verdict.
In this case as in Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261,
409 P2d 121 (Utah 1965):
The parties have had what they
were entitled to: a full and fair
opportunity to present their
contentions and the evidence supporting
them to the court and jury. When this
has been done all presumptions are in
favor of the validity of the verdict
and judgment, at 125.
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision outlined the
evidence presented at trial which the court found supportive
of that decision.

(Addendum 8, p.3,4).

Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that
lay testimony is admissible if the layman's inferences or
opinions are rationally based on the perception of the
witness and are helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony or to a determination of the fact in issue. (Addendum
10).

Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence provides that experts

may testify but does not provide for any situation in which
such testimony is mandatory.

(Addendum 10).

In Roods v. Roods, 645 P2d 640 (Utah 1982), the Utah
Supreme court held that lay opinion regarding the human
F.

Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P2d 221 (Utah 1956).
(17)
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gestation period was proper even though expert testimony
would be admissible with respect to the issue.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff also was in a position to
observe and perceive his injuries; when and how they occurred.
Plaintiff testified at trial that the accident on September
15, 1981 caused his mule to bolt. Mr. Price testified that,
attempting to turn the mule and thus stop him, he twisted
his body and exerted a tremendous amount of force.

He pulled

on the reins with his left hand and pushed on the saddle
with his right hand so forcefully that at the end of the
ordeal the bit in the mule's mouth was bent.

Plaintiff observed,

and testified, that subsequent to this accident he experienced
severe pain and numbness in his arm, his muscles shriveled and
he lost the use of his right hand.

None of these symptoms

were apparent, diagnosed or treated prior to the accident.
In A. E. Egede Nissen v. Crystal

Mountain, Inc., 9 3 Wash.

2d 127, 606 P2d 1214 (1980), the Washington court found no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's allowing Plaintiff
to testify concerning the causal relation between injuries
suffered in an accident and back problems suffered during a
subsequent pregnancy.

It said:

In direct examination, plaintiff was
asked if, during pregnancy, she had
problems resulting from the ski lift
accident. Arguably, the challenged
question called for a medical
conclusion by a law witness. Plaintiff
should not be foreclosed, however, from
(is)

• . ' ; • - ' ^
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comparing the pregnancy and birth
of her first child, prior to the
accident, with the pregnancy and
birth of her second child,
subsequent thereto. Under properly
formulated questions, plaintiff is
qualified to explain differences in
pain or discomfort in the two births,
at 1221.
In this case, Mr. Price was likewise qualified to explain the
differences in his condition before and after his injury.
Appellant, in the case at bar, made no objection to
Mr. Price's testimony.

In the case of Barnett v. Richardson,

415 P2d 987 (Okla. 1966) the court held that where an injury
is patent, objective rather than subjective, the Plaintiff
is competent to testify as to the injury, the treatment
received therefore, and the reaction of such treatment and that
the testimony is sufficient for the jury to render a verdict
and that no expert medical testimony is necessary.

The time

of Mr. Price's injury, the onset of his pain and discomfort,
his shriveled arm and the loss of use of that arm, were patent
and objective indices of injury.
In Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah2d 154, 449 P2d 996 (.1969),
a personal injury action resulting from an automobile collision,
the court held that the trial judge should be allowed
reasonable latitude of discretion both as to the necessity for
expert testimony and as to the qualification of the witness to
give it.

(19)
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Plaintiffs' testimony and records of his medical
history revealed that although Mr. Price was extensively
examined by medical doctors there was no prior medical
diagnosis of the type of injury from which he suffered
after the incident of September 15, 1985.

This evidence was

sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the accident in
question was the cause of the injuries Plaintiff suffered.
It is proper to establish causation through
circumstantial evidence.

When a jury can draw correct

inferences from the facts, expert opinion is not necessary.
At trial Plaintiff introduced evidence from which a jury
could find causation.

Defendant, on the other hand, attempted

to prove a pre-existing injury from which the jury could infer
the absence of causation.
The fact that the Defendants introduced the testimony of
chiropractors regarding pre-existing injury and Plaintiff's
evidence consisted of his own testimony augmented by
documentary evidence does not require that the jury attribute
more weight to the chiropractors' testimony.
In Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P2d 591 (1982), the court held
that:

IT
6.

fN]o matter how arcane the subject
matter or how erudite the witness,
the jury is not required to accept
the experts' testimony as conclusive.
The jurors may give such testimony
any weight they choose, including
no weignt at all. p.597.
Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, supra: at p.
Paz v. Lorenzo SmitF & Son, Inc., 17 Utah2d 221, 408 P2d
186 (1965).
(20)J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The court in Hurler v. The Industrial Commission, 13 Ariz.
App. 66, 474 P2d 73 (1970) held that if the medical opinion
conflicts with the inescapable legal conclusion gleaned from
the facts, the former must give way to the latter. Medical
testimony is not, therefore, conclusive.

Given this fact

and given the fact that lay testimony is sufficient in the
instant case to enable the jury to find causation, medical
testimony is not required.
Unless the doctor is a witness to an accident he must
rely on his patient's statement of history to determine
causation.
accident.

Medical reports in evidence refer to Mr. Price's
(See Gaufin letter of May 10, 1982.

(Plaintiff

Exhibit 4, Addendum 11).
No reports admitted indicated any question that the
incident of September 15, 1981 resulted in the injury for
which they treated Plaintiff.
into evidence, by stipulation.

This letter was introduced
Defendant neither disputed

nor rebutted it's contents.
Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to warrant taking
the issue of causation to the jury.

The testimony of Doctors

Thayn and Sanders support Plaintiffs' testimony and the medical
evidence which was before the jury.

The terms used by the

doctors meets the standard established by this court;
The general rule regarding the
certainty of an expert's opinion
is that of the expert may not
give an opinion which represents

(2D
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a mere guess, speculation, or
conjecture. See 2 Jones on Evidence,
§14:29 (6th ed. 1972). Expert
"~
medical opinion evidence based
on a probability, possibility,
or likelihood has been admitted,
however, where the witnesses
expressed statements in language
which sufficiently represented their
own best judgment to a reasonable
certainty. Jones on Evidence,
supra, at 663-64, explains the
distinction as follows:
Although there are limits as to
how uncertain an expert may be
in his opinions there is still the
question of how certain he may show
himself to be with respect to them
... [T]he witness may use such
language as expresses his actual
state of mind on the matter, whether
it be in terms of possibility,
probability, or actuality. This is
commonly described as testimony that
a result might, could, or would follow
from a given state of facts. [Citations
Omitted].7
It is important to note the case of Rowe v. Maule Drug
Company, 196 Kansas 489, 413 P2d 104 (1966) a case wherein
the court held that the medical testimony objected to as
mere possibility, was an honest expression of professional
opinion of causal connection and also held that medical
testimony of possibility plus lay testimony together are
sufficient to establish a causal connection.
The case of Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F2d 808
(10th Cir. 1981), cited by Defendants, is distinguishable in
that it is a products liability case and therefore espouses a
narrow rule of law within the confines of the crashworthiness
doctrine.
T.

Whether or not this particular roof caused more

State v. Jarrell, 60lTP2d 218, (Utah 1980).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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injuries to Plaintiff than he would have otherwise suffered
in a roll over accident is a question that centers on the
kind and quality of roof - a subject about which jurors can
only speculate.

They cannot compare Plaintiff's injuries in

this case with Plaintiffs' injuries in a roll over accident
involving the crashworthiness of a vehicle roof.

In the

instant case, however, the jurors can compare Plaintiffs1
injuries before and after the accident and logically infer
causation.

There was sufficient evidence introduced to take

the case to the jury.

The jury could infer from the evidence

before it that the accident from which the case arises and
Plaintiffs1 injuries were causally related.

Although, the

evidence on issue of fact was disputed and reasonable people
might arrive at different conclusions.
the jury.

The issue was decided by
8
Their decision should not be disturbed on appeal.

The trier of fact was thoroughly instructed, at Defendants
request, on the issue of causation.

(Instruction 18, 19, 25;

Addendum 12, 13, 14).
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Mr.
9
Price, the established standard for appellate review, this
Court should sustain the decision of the trial court

and

deny appellants request, on appeal, for a new trial.
•/•••

!

.

.

.

'

•

'

8~. Smith v. Vivcich, 8UAR 5, 1985.
9- Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P2d 693 (Utah 1982).
10. McCloud v Baum, 569 P2d 1125 (Utah 1977); Egbert & Jaynes
v. R. C. Tolman7 supra; n.3, citing Charlton V. Hackett, IT
Utah 2d 389 360 P2d 176 (1961) and URCP 59(a)(6), Addendum
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
15,p.l).
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POINT III
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHICH WAS BASED
ON DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS REQUEST TO FURTHER VOIR DIRE THE JURY .
WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE PREJUDICE.
Appellants claim of error and request on appeal that this
court order a new trial is apparently grounded upon the size of
the verdict which the jury returned in favor Respondent.
URCP59(a)(5), (Addendum 15, p .1) .

,,. .-

The recent case of Bennion v. Legrand Johnson Construction,
11 UARP 33 (Utah 19 85) involved a claim on appeal that damages
awarded were excessive and appeared to have been given under
passion or prejudice.

This court outlined applicable Utah law:

Obviously a jury must have some
latitude in the exercise of its
judgment in awarding damages.
It has been stated that "juries are
generally allowed wide discretion
in the assessment of damages." A
reviewing court will defer to a
jury's damage award -unless the
award indicates that the jury
disregarded competent evidence, or
that the award is so excessive beyond
rational justification as to indicate
the effect of improper factors in the
determination, or that "it clearly
appears that the award was rendered
under [a] misunderstnading." To
justify a new trial for excessive
damages under Rule 59(a)(5), Utah R.
Civ. P., the damage award must be more
than generous; it must be clearly
excessive on any rational view of the
evidence. at 36. [Citations Omitted].
(24)
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The jury in this case was instructed thoroughly and
correctly in the applicable law of damages.

All instructions

given on the damage issue were given at the request of
Defendants.

They were told that general damages could be

awarded to Plaintiff which would fairly and adequately
compensate him for mental and physical harm, its duration and
severity, the extent he prevented from pursuing his normal
affairs of life, loss of earning capacity and future damage of
the same kind.

(Instructions 20, 22, 23, 24, Addenda 16, 17,

18, 19). Instructions 26, 27, 28, 29, and 32, (Addenda 20,
21, 22, 23, and 24) cautions the jury with regard to limitations
on their calculation of said damage.
As in Bennion the trial court in the case presently
before this court found that there was adequate evidence of
aggravation of Mr. Price's physical condition and loss of income
to justify the damage award.

(Addendum 8, p.2).

In the absence of any proof on the record of actual
juror bias, 11 Appellant argues the possibility of juror bias
allegedly transferring itself to Defendant, U.P.& L., as a result
of lay offs at Emery Mining Company.
Several cases cited by Appellant to support its argument
that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its voir
dire of the jury require distinction.
In the case of Anderson v. Montgomery, 607 P2d 838,(Utah
1980), this court found that discovery after trial, of an
TT

Hanson v. General Builders Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143,
389 P2d 61 (1964).
(25)
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attorney client relationship between Defendant's counsel
and juror did not materially affect Plaintiffs right to an
impartial jury and did not: constitute prejudicial error.
In Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P2d 533 (Utah 1981) the case
was reversed and remanded on three grounds; one of which
was a statement by a juror on voir dire that she might
be biased in favor of Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion for

removal of this juror for cause had been denied.
State v. Ball, 685 P2d 1055 (Utah 1983), was a criminal
case (driving under the influence of alcohol) which was
vacated and remanded when the court would not further voir dire
four witnesses whose answers indicated a possible bias against
the use of alcohol which was a material issue in the case.
The trial court in this case excused on it's own Motion
all those who indicated the slightest possibility of bias.
The trial judge has broad discretion in the manner in
which voir dire is accomplished. 12 In this case the trial
judge conducted extensive voir dire, excusing jurors on the
court's motion for hints of bias that have, which in other cases
have been found to fall outside the scope of the applicable rule.
URCP 47(f).

(Addendum 25).

The trial court felt and stated

on the record that the question proposed by Appellant had been
adequately dealt with in another question (Trans. 42) in which
the Court asked:
TT.

Utah State Road v. "Marriott, 21 Utah 2d 238, 444 P2d 57
(1968), State v. Dixon, 560 P2d 318 (Utah 1977), State v.
Lacy, 665 Pzd 1311 (Utah 1983), Maltby v. Cox Const. Co.,
Inc., 598 P2d 336 (Utah 1979).
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(26)

...Have any of you had any
experiences whatsoever that
might make you not consider the
said advocated by Utah Power &
Light or give it less weight or
more weight because of some
dealings you might have had, other
than an open dispute...[Trans. 33,
Emphasis Added].
The jury was thoroughly instructed by the court
regarding impartiality.

(Instructions 3, 9, 12, 23, 25, 29,

Addendum 26, 27, 28, 18, 14, 23).
There is no basis to Appellant's claim that the trial
court abused its discretion. The decision rendered below
13
should be upheld on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Judgment on verdict of the jury should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

SL

MA&LYNN BENNETT LEMA
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT,
VICTOR PRICE

TT.

Maltby, supra at N.12.
(27)
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VICTOR PRICE,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
A Utah C o r p o r a t i o n , and
DAVID ZSERAI,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No. 2 0 5 6 8

Marlynn Bennett Lema, an attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
108 North Fourth West, P.O. Box 1026, Price, Utah 84501, states
that she served the Brief of Respondent upon the following
parties by placing four true and correct copies thereof in
an envelope addressed to:
Robert Gordon
David A. Westerby
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
1407 West North Temple
P.O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
and mailing the same, postage prepaid, on the «&5aay of
September, 1985.
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH IN ANDfOR EMERY CO.

MOV 2 8 1984
BRUCE C. FUNK,
^/•SCflU

By.

Clerk
Deoutv

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VICTOR PRICE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SPECIAL VERDICT

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and
DAVID ZSERAI,

Civil No. 4210

Defendants.

We, the jury, return our verdict in this case by answering
the following questions, in accordance with the instructions of
Judge Bunnell:
1.

.

Were defendants David Zseirai and Utah Power & Light

Company negligent in the operation of heavy equipment in Emery
County on 15 September 1981?

2.

Yes

0 1

2 3

4

No

0 l ( 2 ) 3 .

5

4 5

(6?

7

6

8

7 8 '

If "yes" (by 6 or more jurors), was such negligence of

David Zserai and Utah Power & Light Company a proximate cause of
the damages"sustained by Victor Price?
Yes

0

1

No

0

1

2

3. ' 4

(2) 3

*4

5

(?)

7

8

5

6

7

8

ffjJlMM^
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3.

Was plaintiff Victor Price negligent in failing to

properly care for his own safety while riding his mule on
15 September 1981?

4.

Yes

0

1

2

3

4

5

(6)

7

8

No

0

1

(2)

3

4

5

6

7

8

If "yes" (by 6 or more jurors) , was such negligence of

Victor Price a proximate cause of the damages sustained by him?

5.

Yes

0

No

0

1
Q

2

3

4

5 ,^ 0

8

2

3

4

5

8

6 7

This question is answered only if we have found above

that both the defendants and the plaintiff were negligent in a
way that proximately caused damages to the plaintiff.

In other

words, at least 6 of us have answered "yes" to each of the 4
questions above.

Otherwise, we do not answer this question.

We now consider the negligence of the defendants and the
plaintiff to total 100%. We allocate the 100% negligence between
the defendants, on the one hand, and the plaintiff, on the other
hand, by weighing the negligence of the defendants against that
of the plaintiff and determining relative negligence.

Our answer

in percentages reflects our decision.
What part of the 100% negligence is attributable to:
Defendants David Zserai and
Utah Power & Light Company*

V<? %

Plaintiff Victor Price

fo

%

100

%

TOTAL
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6.

Considering only the instructions and evidence concerning damages,

and without being concerned with fault or negligence in answering this
question, what amount of money would fairly and adequately compenstate
plaintiff, Victor Price, for any and all damages sustained as a result of the
accident on 15 September 1981?

Q?5S<3

Special damage

$

General damage

$ /<5^, 0 0°

Total

$ f£~Q3 5 O
_*

j — ^

Jury Forman
DATED:

£jf

November, 1984

^r-
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ADMITTANCE RECORD

K-66U

PaC. N a t ' l JHf^TAI. NUMBER

P r i c e , Mr. V i c t o r

ADDRESS

Castle Dale,

BIRTH DATE

£

2-15-12

^

(

CODE

Utah
SEX

7^8-2^3

RACE

S.M.W.D.

TIME

6:30 ?v

3-17-68

PHONE

SS.NO.

LOCAL

E

A.R.Demman

PHYSICIAN

P T S . EMPLOYER 1 O C C U P A T I O N

ROOM

. w

M

A D M . DATE

Ins.

|

self

NEAREST RELATIVE OR FRIEND 1

Mrs, Alice

N

rancher
RELATION

wf

Price

1'
DIS. DATE

TIME

RELIGION

ADDRESS O F RELATIVE OR F R I E N D
c

fa*- c*t

•

same

LDS

SUMMARY AND DISCHARGE RECORD

Admission Diagnosis

INDEX CODE

*JL
Final Diagnosis

J
lUo^t^-^ A jOj-,
Utal^X'
{
'
ft"
r^Z^l^T^TZTT^j^T^

a^jxz^^j^ ci A<V
0.

tf

V2£JL

L^k^L.

Complications .

Treatment Rendered

&S\Surgery, including manipulation and/or reduction (specify).

%£.w3^»k .£&:!

Q Antibacterial (specify)
Supportive Only
D Other

Blood Transfusions
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DISCHARGE SUMMARY
ADMISSION:
DISCHARGE:

ZE, VICTOR
65,.MALE, WHITE

9/

6/77
9/15/77

This 65 year old male was admitted on 9/6/77 and released
on 9/15/77 following
an
try when a horse bucked and ran right over him producing multiple
injuries
with a.
rture of the right ulna and with a fracture
of the left ulna and radius and also
>ration of the scalp and multiple
injuries.
ICAL EXAMINATION: Temp:
RAL:

T:

V:

>:
AVASCULAR:
WITIES:
\ATICS:
^LOGICAL:
TAL COURSE:
ATORY:

St

\SIS:

&d

99

Pulse:

80

Resp:

21

B.P.:

140/80

A well nourished,
slight obese male admitted
to the
hospital
following
an accident when the horse went over him.
Normal in appearance.
No excoriations
or dermatosis
is
present.
Round and symmetrical.
The eardrums are intact.
He has a
laceration
of the scalp.
Pupils are round and equal and react
to light and accommodation.
There is no nasal
obstruction.
Throat is normal in
appearance.
Equal expansion on both sides.
Both sides symmetrical.
He has
marked pain due to breathing on the left side.
Possible
some
fractured
ribs.
No fluid,
no rales,
no
consolidation.
Normal sinus rhythm.
No murmurs, no thrills,
no
arrhytmias.
No
deformity.
He has a great deal of swelling and deformity
of the left
wrist.
He has multiple
contusions
and also laceration
of the
scalp.
No enlargement of the axillary
or cervical
lymph
glands.
All physiological
reflexes
are
present.
Uninventful.
Reduction of the fracture
was done.
Urine, within normal limits
with the exception
of 4,5, to 7 white
blood cells per high powered field.
The WBC was 17,500.
The
hemoglobin 14.8 grs., hematocrit
was 46%. Stabs. 13, Segs.
68,
Lymphs. 16, Monos. 2.
iLeft wrist shows comminuted fracture
of the distal
radius
with
extension
into the articular
surface where there is a
fracture
of the ulnar styloid
process at the
base.
Skull fracture,
none present.
Had^a large lac^i^f-inn nn th*.
frontal
area .and a possible
fracture
of ribs on the left
side.
The reduction
was done and views of the left
wrist shows the
fracture
of the distal
radius.
The cast has been applied
and
shows a fracture
relationship
satisfactorily.
Ulnar
styloid
fractures
also noted.
Cast was applied and after
reduction,
under general anesthesia.
....*.-.

The patient will see me again in the future and the diagnosis
was a fracture of the left wrist, piultiple contusions and
laceration of the scalp.

EMMAN, M.D.

t&dtofiitiwj

fat/
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DISCHARGE SUMMARY

PRICE, VICTOR
AGE 68, MALE, WHITE

-

HOSPITAL #10520

ADMISSION:
DISCHARGE:

1/7/81
1/25/81

This 69 year old male was admitted to the hospital on 1/7/81 and released
on 1/25/81.
GENERAL:
HEENT:

68 year old male, slight obese.
Head is round and symmetrical. Ear drums are intact.
Pupils are round and equal, react to light and accomodation.
No nasal obstruction. Throat is normal in appearance.
CHEST:
Equal expansion on both sides. Both sides symmetrical.
LUNGS:
No fluid, no rales, no consolidation.
CARDIOVASCULAR:
Normal sinus rhythm. No murmurs, no thrills, no arrhythmias.
ABDOMEN:
No masses, no tenderness, no rigidity.
BACK:
No deformity.
EXTREMITIES:
No varicosities. No dermatosis. No excoriations.
GENITALIA:
Normal externally.
RECTAL:
No internal, external hemorrhoids are present.
NEUROLOGICAL:
Reflexes are normal.
He was referred to Dr. Wally Snihurowych for T.U.R.
He had a T.U.R.
done in 1973 and at the present time he had an obstruction which was taken care
of by a T.U.R. by Dr. Snihurowych. The course in the hospital was uneventful
and the discharge condition was good.
DIAGNOSIS:
1) Right hydrocele which was repaired.
2) T.U.R. which was done by Dr. H.M. Snihurowych,
3) Benign hypertrophy of the prostate.
He will report to my office and also.to Dr. Snihurowych when the time
is designated for further instruction.

A.R. OEMMAN, M.D.
ARD/jj
1/25/81
1/26/81
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Robert Gordon
David A. Westerby for
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
P.O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 535-4265
Attorneys for Defendant
Utah Power & Light Company
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VICTOR PRICE,

)
. )

Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and
DAVID ZSERAI,

)
) _ REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL
)
)
Civil No. 4210
)
)
) ':'•
)

Defendants.

)
)

Defendants Utah Power & Light Company and David Zserai
hereby request a trial by jury on all factual issues in this
case.
The required fee of $50.00 is enclosed herewith.

PuauJes^
iJavid A. Westerby
»•

Date:

/( bk>«£jr\l>Qj~ » 9 S ^
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MOV 23 1984
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE C. FUNK,
py

" < | ^ n tT.

VICTOR PRICE,
Plaintiff,

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and
DAVID ZERAI,

JURY

LIST

Case No.

4210

Defendants.
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
VICTOR PRICE,

)
,
'
)

Plaintiff,

)

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation, and
DAVID ZSERAI,
Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION
*
FOR NEW TRIAL

)

*

)

Civil No. 4210

The defendants have filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The plaintiff has
filed their objection to the motion and both-parties have submitted their
memorandums of points and authorities and the Court heard oral arguments
on the motion and rules thereon as hereinafter stated.
The defendants base their motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the following grounds:
1. The evidence was insufficient to establish a duty of care
running from the defendants to the plaintiffs;
2.

There was no evidence of causation in fact between the

incident and the damages complained of.
They base their Motion for a new trial, in the alternative, on the
same grounds stated above and on the'further ground that the Court failed to
ask prospective jurors as to the affect of lay-offs within their families
that might have a bearing on their impartiality and, further, that damages
were excessive.

,
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In considering the Motion, the Court must look at the evidence
in its best possible light to see that a prima facie case has been
presented and if there was sufficient believable facts presented so
that reasonable jurors could reach the conclusion found by the jury.
The Court cannot find any prejudice for failure to ask the
prospective jurors a question relative to lay-offs within their families.
The jurors were adequately and thoroughly questioned about any prejudice
against the defendant, Utah Power and Light Comoany, to insure impartiality
in this regard and, therefore, the Court denies the Motion based upon this
ground.
The jurors obviously believed the plaintiff's testimony that the
defendant, Zserai, summoned and beckoned the plaintiff to come to his
machine on his mule where the defendant Zserai was seeking directions and
information from the plaintiff. When the plaintiff came to within three
or four feet of the machine on his mule, a clear duty was present on the
part of the defendant Zserai to operate the machine so 3s not to startle
the animal on which the plaintiff was seated/ The Court also denies the
Motion based upon this ground.
The Court will not disturb the amount of damages as found by the
jury since there was adequate evidence by way of aggravation of his existing
physical condition that resulted in a shriveled right arm and loss of income
to justify the jury's ultimate finding in this regard. *

*

*

-Page Two-

-
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The question-of causation has given the Court some problem
because of the lack of direct expert testimony in this regard.
In Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 497 P2d 28, 27 Ut2d 419, the
Court stated:
"Jurors may not speculate as to probabilities;
they may, however, make justifiable inferences
from circumstantial evidence to find negligence
or proximate cause. In such instances, circumstancial
evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of negligence, if men of reasonable minds
may conclude that there is a greater probability
that the conduct relied upon was the proximate
cause of the injury than there is that it was not."
In reviewing the evidence presented in this case, the Court feels
that there was sufficient evidence presented from which reasonable minds
could conclude that there is a greater probability that the conduct relied
upon was a proximate cause of plaintiff's resulting injuries.
Although the plaintiff had a prior condition in his back and limbs
that precipitated treatment by a chiropractor, there was testimony presented
by the plaintiff that he experienced extreme pain ^in his hip, neck and
shoulders, immediately after the incident that he had not experienced before.
That the day following the incident, he had difficulty walking and felt
dizziness, and there was further testimony that his friends noticed a marked
change in his physical activities and appearance immediately after the accident.
There was further testimony that the plaintiff went to Dr. Sanders,
a Chiropractor, who had treated the plaintiff in the past, the day after the
accident, and told him of the incident and that he was feeling numbness in
his limbs and had pain and discomfort in his back and hips.

There was further

testimony that Dr. Sanders attempted treatment without result, and then
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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referred the plaintiff to Dr. Demman, a physician, and that at that time,
the plaintiff complained of head, hip and neck pain, and numbness of
his limbs.
The plaintiff further testified that right after the accident
his hand became useless, that his right arm began to shrivel and, because
of these results, Dr. Demman commenced a series of therapy treatments at
the hospital, without any noticeable resultThen, in the early part of February, 1982, Dr. Demman referred
the plaintiff to the neurologist who performed surgery on his vertebrae
in February of 1982, at a time when he was complaining of the same symptoms,
only greatly aggravated, that were present right after the accident occurred.
The surgery improved his condition as far as relieving the pain and numbness,
and he generally felt better.
Dr. GaufiVs report, introduced into evidence, states: "Post
i

operatively the patient has done well with numbness in the fourth and fifth
fingers of his right hand improved to almost normal.

The aching that he had

in his elbow was no longer present, patient's pain in his npck was significantly
improved at the time of discharge from the hospital."
The Doctors further reports indicate that after the operation,
the syniptons present for the first time right after the accident were eliminated
or improved substantially by the surgery.

|

In Dr. Gaufin's letter to Dr. Demman, dated May. 10, 1982, he states
as follows:

"His right arm and hand strength' is still weaker than it was

before his accident, but it is significantly better than before his suraerv."
^
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Based upon this Finding, the Court denies the Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, a
Motion for New Trial.
<f

(

DATED this ,_..Xv day of February, 1985.
•->

BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT

JUDGF*

v*
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of
the foregoing, MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, by depositing
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the.following:

DATED this Z3t/

David A. Westerby
Robert Gordon
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah

84110

Marlynn B. Lema
Attorney at Law
108 North 4th West
Post Office Box 1026
Price, Utah
'••

84501

day of February, 1985.

Secretary
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Rule 50

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

rogatory. Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah
1979).
Failure to request special interrogatory
waives issue of fact. If a party fails to request
that a fact issue be submitted to the jury on
special interrogatory, he waives his right to
trial by jury on that issue, and the court may
make a finding consistent with the jury verdict.
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979).

Rule 50

Rule 50

Entering
judgment
on
special
interrogatories discretionary with trial
court. The matter of entering judgment in
accordance with the answers to special
interrogatories is within the discretion of the
trial judge. Weber Basin Water Conservancy
Dist. v. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81
(1960).

Rule 50. Motion for a Directed Verdict and for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict.
(a) Motion for Directed Verdict; When Made; Effect A party who moves for
a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made.
A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without
any assent of the jury.
(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Whenever a motion
for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any
reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.
Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a
directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion
for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within ten
days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance
with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined
with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict
was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the
judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the
requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may
direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or
may order a new trial.
(c) Same; Conditional Rulings on Grant of-Motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for
in subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on the
motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted
if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the
grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the motion
for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not
affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has
been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the
new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered.
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Rule 50

Rule 50

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the
respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if the judgment
is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with
the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: Denial ofMotion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent,
assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate court
concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment,
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether
a new trial shall be granted.
I. General Consideration.
II. Motion for Directed Verdict.
III. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Cited in Smith v. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16,
376 P.2d 541 (1962); Hyland v. St. Mark's
Hosp., 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967);
Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431
P.2d 566 (1967); Collier v. Frerichs, 626 P.2d
476 (Utah 1981); Jepsen v. Tenhoeve, 656 P.2d
427 (Utah 1982).
II. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
Court to view e v i d e n c e i n light most
favorable to n o n m o v a n t Upon a motion for a
directed verdict, the trial court is obliged to
view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the party against whom it is directed. Anderson
f. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973).
Error in judge's w e i g h i n g e v i d e n c e not
reversible where decision c o r r e c t Although
in passing on a motion for directed verdict it is
not proper for the trial court judge to weigh
evidence, that he does so in a case does not
result in prejudicial error where the party is not
entitled to succeed in any event. Cerritos
Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d
608 (Utah 1982).
Appellate court to v i e w e v i d e n c e in light
most favorable to nonmovant. Upon review
of a directed verdict, the court must examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the
kwing party, and if there is a reasonable basis
in the evidence and in the inferences to be
drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed

r

verdict cannot be sustained. Management
Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n
ex rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).
A n d sustain grant of motion only if n o
different conclusion possible. The Supreme
Court will sustain the granting of a motion for
a directed verdict only if the evidence was such
that reasonable men could not arrive at a different conclusion. Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d
68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973).
A directed verdict pursuant to subdivision
(a), upon the ground that the evidence fails to
show that defendant is negligent,
is
tantamount to granting a motion for a nonsuit,
and on appeal must be reversed if the evidence
is such that reasonable men could arrive at a
different conclusion. Rhiness v. Dansie, 24
Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970).
III. MOTION FOR J U D G M E N T
* NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT
The trial court can enter a j u d g m e n t
notwithstanding the verdict for only o n e
reason — the absence of any substantial evidence to support the verdict. Koer v. Mayfair
Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967).
Rules for deciding motion for directed
verdict applicable. In passing on a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the
court is governed by the same rules as it is when
passing upon a motion for a directed verdict.
Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431
P.2d 566 (\967).
. .
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Rule 615
% Extrinsic
nibble unless
sane and the
benon, or the
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Rule 701

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 702

ARTICLE VII.
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY.
Rule 70L Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

e gt ftement to the
r tjh< substance of
ictose (1971). The
v-£i> formerly in
^ci^ee (1971).

& ny Court,
the suggestion
* examine witipss.es, whether
iU? or to interi>!« opportunity

COMMITTEE NOTE
This Rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is
substantially the same as Rule 19, Utah Rules
of Evidence (1971). Rule 56(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971) contained similar language.

period. The admission of a mother's testimony
on the subject of gestation period of her pregnancy is not error. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Mother may testify as to her gestation

Rule 702. Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
COMMITTEE NOTE
This Rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Rule
56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was substantially the same.

n^d so that they
g t; e order of its
ur-rty who is a
it, not a natural
a person whose
;^n of his cause.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Question as to whether witness qualifies
as expert is forjudge. The trial judge has the
primary responsibility
for
determining
whether a particular witness qualifies as an
expert. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d
1168 (Utah 1980).
Qualification. The matter of qualification of
in expert witness lies in the discretion of the
court. State v. Locke, 688 P.2d 464 (Utah 1984).
Facts or data used by a properly
qualified expert in forming an opinion need
sot be in evidence if they are of a type reason-

ably relied on by experts in the witness's field
of expertise. Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
Trial court did not err in allowing an expert's
testimony relating to drug experience reports
not in evidence. Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
Opinion of expert witness based on evidence presented at trial. Expert's testimony
was properly excluded where witness was
unable to give his opinion based upon data
made known to him at trial, as, absent personal
knowledge of the facts, this was the only ground
on which the evidence could have come in.
Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).
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1 saw Ht. Trice iu the office today on 5/10/82 lor a follow-up visit. The
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1) Ratinfactory course following anterior ccrvicai diskectomy with nerve root
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the right elbow, 2/0/82.
,
•-. ."..'•* ' *
' - ;
v .: ; .

rr^iy.'ifaipATiona:

;

; '

*.

!

.V- .'.' '•" ••".',• '

•,

1) 1 have instrur.'^d Vr. Trice on appropriate a c t i v i t i e s • I f e e l his strength
w i l l -r.i.iinii? to itrpjovo over the ii-xt ].{j to ?A moiWh?. The numbness w i l l
' i m ^ I»MVO to bo obicvr<1 1 frequently thin too resolves over a period of
rKufc 1\* yc-ovn.
.'
''
2) 1. tw. *• p;f »d i«im to continue to chock with your of f l o e , i f yoil would like
to lvive i«?. i:e-6valut»l:e him at buy time* I would be happy to do sd. >,'
.

!

* ,# ',

' ,#v

Sincerely yours,

r

-

#j!i«&\*; V'. ;
Lyi^M. Gaiffinj H.D.
MW:lr

'.

u\\

.r,j'

v

'

i•*;••

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"'

d/tUtUUwyi //

INSTRUCTION NO

The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.

It is the cause that

necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the
injury.

For one person's negligence to be a proximate cause of

an injury, that negligence must be a substantial or material
factor in bringing about the injury.

-~v
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INSTRUCTION NO.

A plaintiff, such as Victor Price, may also be negligent
with respect to his own injuries.

Such negligence of a plaintiff

may cooperate with the negligence of another in proximately
causing his own injury.

If you determine that David Zserai and

Utah Power & Light Company were negligent and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, you
will also be asked to determine whether Victor Price was also
negligent in bringing about his own injuries.

/^e*&6^
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INSTRUCTION NO.

tyj

You are not to award damages for any injury or condition
from which the plaintiff may have suffered, or may now be
suffering, unless it has been established by a preponderance of
the evidence in the case that such injury or condition was
proximately caused by the accident in question, not by a
condition or accident that occurred before.

If you find that

Victor Price suffers or did suffer from some abnormal condition
that has not been proximately caused by Utah Power or David
Zserai, even though it may invite your sympathy, you may not
assess any damages against Utah Power or David Zserai for that
condition.

However, if negligence of Utah Power or David Zserai

has been a proximate cause of aggravating such a condition, that
should be considered in fixing damages.
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Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 59

satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction,
if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution
shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and shall
direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from the
judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
(e) Filing Transcript of Satisfaction in Other Counties. When any
satisfaction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of
the county in which such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of
satisfaction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment may
have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall
be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same effect
as in the county where the same was originally entered.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Cited in Utah C.V. Fed. Credit Union v.
Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1974).

Rule 59. New Trials; Amendments of Judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
110
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Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 59

(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a newT trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for a new trial is made
under subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after entry ofjudgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
I General Consideration.
II. Grounds.
A In General.
8. Misconduct of Jury.
C. Accident or Surprise.
D. Newly Discovered Evidence.
E. Excessive or Inadequate Damages.
F. Insufficiency of Evidence.
G. Decision Against Law.
II! Time for Motion.
IV Affidavits.
V On Initiative of Court.

,

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION
The Supreme Court cannot consider a
motion for a new trial since that is a matter
Hdressed to the trial court. Jennings v. Stoker,
#2 P2d 912 (Utah 1982).
A motion for a new trial is not properly
iddressed nor may it be filed with the Supreme
Court. Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472
P2d 430 (1970).
An order granting a new trial is not a
final judgment; it only sets aside the verdict
iH places the parties in the same position as if
^•re had been no previous trial. Haslam v.
Fiulwn, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1964).
Remedies for questioning grant of a new
triil. If a trial court's authority with respect to
• w>tion for a new trial is exercised arbitrarily,
t** proper redress is either in a petition for
~>riocutory appeal, which may be granted in
i proper case, or in the preservation of error for
*vfw, if necessary, upon the final outcome of
** case. Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185,
V* P.2d 736 (1964).
A timely motion under this Rule termi•atet the running of the time for appeal of

•

a judgment, and time for appeal does not begin
to run again until the order granting or denying
such a motion is entered. Hume v. Small Claims
Court, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979).
Standard for review. When a new trial is
granted based on the weight of the evidence, the
standard for reviewing the trial court's ruling is
much narrower than the trial court's standard
in granting the new trial. Goddard v. Hickman,
685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984).
A trial court has a wide latitude of discretion with respect to a motion for a new trial,
in conformity with the general supervisory
powers which it necessarily has over the
verdicts of juries in the interest of the administration of justice. Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah
2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1964).
The broad discretionary power of the trial
court in the granting or denying of new trials is
well established. This discretion is necessary to
allow the court an opportunity to cause
reexamination or correction of jury verdicts or
findings which it believes to be in error, or
where there is substantial doubt that the issues
were fairly tried. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins.
Co., 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964).

in
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INSTRUCTION NO.

%

Without being concerned about fault or negligence, it will be your
duty to determine the plaintiff's damages, if any, as you may find from a
preponderance of the evidence will fairly and adequately compensate him for any
injury and damage he has sustained as a proximate result of the accident.

^fe^W/^
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In awarding such damages, you may consider the nature and
extent of the injuries sustained by him; the degree and character
of his suffering, both mental and physical, its probable duration
and severity, and the extent to which he has been presented from
pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as enjoyed by him before
the accident; and any disability or loss of earning capacity
resulting from such injury.
You may also consider whether any of the above will, with
reasonable certainty, continue in the future, and if you so find,
award such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the
plaintiff therefor*

/td^^^^
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INSTRUCTION NO.

il

In fixing damages, the law allows you to fix a sum that will
reasonably compensate plaintiff for any past physical pain, as well as pain
that is reasonably certain to be suffered in the future as a result of the
defendant's wrongdoing.
There are no objective guidelines by which you can measure the money
equivalent of this element of injury; the only real measuring stick, if it can
be so described, is your collective enlightened conscience. You should
consider all the evidence bearing on the nature of the injuries, the certainty
of future pain and the likely duration thereof.
In this difficult task of putting a money figure on an aspect of
injury that does not readily lend itself to an evaluation in terms of money,
you should try to be as objective, calm and dispassionate as the situation will
permit,
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INSTRUCTION NO.

2{

In assessing damage, you may determine if plaintiff has lost, or is
reasonably likely to lose, profits from the interruption or destruction of an
established business, and that the amount of such loss or future losses can,
from the evidence, be estimated with reasonable certainty, you may include this
loss in determining the damage, if any, to be awarded.

Ordinarily, unless the

business was an established business at the time of the wrong, this item should
not be considered because the possiblity of any such profits would be too
speculative and conjectural to be reasonably susceptible of evaluation; the
evidence should be enough to show that the business had been successfully
operated for a time long enough to give it recognition as a profitable entity
and that these profits can be estimated with reasonable certainty.
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The amount of damages fox any loss to be suffered in the
future would not be the present payment of the total of such
damages, but must be discounted to the present cash value of such
future benefit.

Therefore, in determining the present value of

any future loss, you should calculate the same on the basis that
any sum you might award will be invested with reasonable wisdom,
and that all of it, except the amount currently needed to
compensate for the loss sustained will be kept so invested as to
yield the highest rate of interest consistent with current
interest rates and reasonable security.

The present value will

be the sum which, when supplemented by such income from it, will
equal the total of lost future benefits.

/fa/w^"" z°
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INSTRUCTION NO

•4

In awarding damages, if any, in this case, you should be
aware that the recovery of damages by the plaintiff in this case
would not be taxed as income under federal or state tax laws.

£/y&?s^.
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You are not p e r m i t t e d to award p l a i n t i f f speculative
d a m a g e s , by w h i c h term is m e a n t compensation for detriment w h i c h
is remote, c o n j e c t u r a l or s p e c u l a t i v e .
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•i

In this case you may not include in any award to plaintiff
any sura for the purpose of punishing the defendants for the
public good or to prevent other accidents.

Such damages would be

punitive rather than compensatory, and the law does not authorize
punitive damages in this action.

tffltfayid^
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The law forbids you to determine any issue in this case by
resort to chance.

If you should decide that any party is

entitled to recover, in discussing the amount of damages to be
awarded, you properly could ascertain from each juror his own
independent judgment as to what the amount should be —
should so wish t.o do —

if you

whereupon, it would be your duty to

thoughtfully consider the amounts so suggested, to test them in
the light of the law and the evidence, and, after deliberation
thereon, to determine which, if any, of such individual estimates
was proper.

But it would be unlawful for you to agree in advance

to take the independent estimate of each juror, then total such
estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make such
average the amount of your award.
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 47

Ij
i

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION
correct, any error which prevents counsel from
Parties have a right to make objections to m a k i n S objections thereto is harmless error.
instructions so as to preserve challenges to j ? £ ^ 8 * n f h r i s t e n 8 e n ' n U t a h 2 d *> 3 5 4 P 2 d
their accuracy. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 5 t l ; / 7 r w „
c o c 0 OJ . . .
V
2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960).
,tn ^ f o ^ *
' ^ ^
But refusal of right harmless if instruc- ( U t a n i y b U
tions are correct If the instructions are
<-. .

j
J
1
!

Rule 47. Jurors.
(a) Examination of Jurors. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or their
attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional
questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper.
(b) Alternate Jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition
to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior
to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified
to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner,
shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination
and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same functions,
powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An alternate juror who
does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to
consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called each party is
entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed.
The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against an alternate
juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall not be used
against the alternates.
(c) Challenge Defined, By Whom Made. A challenge is an objection made to
the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual juror.
Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d) Challenge to Panel; Time and Manner of Taking; Proceedings. A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms
prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the intentional omission of the officer to summon one or more of the jurors drawn. It
must be taken before the juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be noted by
the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the ground
of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the jury so
far as the trial in question is concerned.
(e) Challenges to Individual Jurors; Number ofPeremptory Challenges. The
challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under
subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.
80
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 47

(f) Challenges for Cause; How Tried. Challenges for cause may be taken on
one or more of the following grounds:
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a
person competent as a juror.
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party,
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party.
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward,
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and
creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a resident
thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license fee, or
service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to such
resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then
a witness therein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action,
or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a
member or citizen of a municipal corporation.
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party
challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of
having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public
journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that
the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to himAny challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, and
any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such challenge.
(g) Selection of Jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow
for all peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause
sutained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, shall
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn
until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to.constitute
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose
names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(h) Oath ofJury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and truly
try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered according to the evidence and the instructions of th6 court.
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(i) Proceedings When Juror Discharged. If, after the impanelling of the jury
and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his duty
and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the other
jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the parties do
not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be tried with
a new jury.
(j) View of Jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to
have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in
which material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body
under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by
some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are thus
absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on any
subject connected with the trial.
(k) Separation ofJury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during
the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by
the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally submitted to them.
(1) Deliberation of Jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury they
may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be kept
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Unless
by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must not suffer
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, before the verdict
is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the
verdict agreed upon.
(m) Papers Taken by Jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take
with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers which
have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or copies of such
papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from the person
having them in possession; and they may also take with them notes of the
testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves or any of them,
but none taken by any other person.
(n) Additional Instructions. After the jury have retired for deliberation, if
there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or if they
desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they may require
the officer to conduct them into the court. Upon their being brought into court
the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to,
the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in writing or taken
down by the reporter.
(o) New Trial When No Verdict Given. If a jury is discharged or prevented
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew.
(p) Court Deemed in Session Pending Verdict; Verdict May Be Sealed. While
the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in respect to
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other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with the cause
submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The
court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the opening of the court,
in case of an agreement during a recess or actfournment for the day.
(q) Declaration of Verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or such
other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to Rule
48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their names
called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the verdict must
be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the clerk to the jury,
and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either party may require the
jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or clerk asking each juror
if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is an insufficient
number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be sent out again;
otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from the
cause.
(r) Correction of Verdict If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient,
it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may
be sent out again.
I. General Consideration.
II. Examination.
III. Challenges for Cause.
IV. View By Jury.
V. Deliberations.
VI. Papers Taken By Jury.
VII. Additional Instructions.
VIII. No Verdict.
IX. Declaration of Verdict.
X. Correction of Verdict.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION
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Cited in Arellano v. Western Pac. R.R., 5
Utah 2d 146, 298 P.2d 527 (1956); Johnson v.
Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959);
Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d
942 (1970); State v. Pace, 527 P.2d 658 (Utah
1974).
II. EXAMINATION
Trial judge h a s w i d e discretion i n conduct of voir dire. A trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion as to manner
and form in which he will conduct a voir dire
examination to determine the qualifications of
jurors. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Marriott, 21
Utah 2d 238, 444 P.2d 57 (1968).
HI. CHALLENGES F O R CAUSE
Acquaintance with o r e n g a g i n g in s a m e
business as party n o t g r o u n d s for challenge. Challenges for cause on the grounds that
jurors were either acquainted with the defendant or engaged in same business pursuits as

defendant did not fall within the grounds specified in subdivision (f) and were properly denied.
C.R. Owens Trucking Corp. v. Stewart, 29 Utah
2d 353, 509 P.2d 821 (1973).
Requiring u s e of peremptory c h a l l e n g e s
instead of granting challenge for cause
affects rights. Forcing a party to use his
peremptory challenges to strike jurors who
should have been stricken for cause denies the
litigant a substantial right. Jenkins v. Parrish,
627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981)..
IV. VIEW BY J U R Y
In a n eminent domain action, jury m a y
v i e w property even though there were substantial changes to the property during construction, to see how the property was situated
with respect to its surroundings. Utah State Rd.
Comm'n v. Marriott, 21 Utah 2d 238, 444 P.2d
57 (1968).
V. DELIBERATIONS
Jury verdict not impeachable on basis of
deliberations. Generally a jury's verdict may
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INSTRUCTION NO

. 3

This case must not be decided for or against anyone because
you feel sorry for anyone or angry at anyone.

It is your sworn

duty to decide this case based on the facts and the law without
regard to sympathy, passion, or prejudice.
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INSTRUCTION NO

•4-

Remember, the lawyers aren't on trial.

Your feelings about

them should not influence your decision in this case.
It is the duty of the attorney on each side of a case to
object when the other side offers evidence which the attorney
believes is not admissible.

You should not speculate as to the

reason for the objections, nor should you show bias against a
party because his attorney has made objections.

|k

When objections

are made, the court is called upon to determine whether the

f
offered evidence might be properly admitted.

You are not to be

concerned with the reasons for such rulings and are not to draw
any inferences from them.

Whether offered evidence is admissible

or not is purely a question of law.

In admitting evidence to

which an objection is made, the Court does not determine what

#

i
weight should be given to such evidence -, nor does it pass on the
credibility of the witness.
determination.

These are matters for your

§

However, you are not to consider evidence offered

but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by the Court.

As

to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not
conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the
reason for the objection since these are matters of law not
properly within your consideration.
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INSTRUCTION NO
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By a preponderance of the evidence, as that term is used in
these instructions, is meant that which to your minds is of the
greater weight.

The evidence preponderates to the side which, to

your minds, seems to be the most convincing and satisfactory.
The preponderance of the evidence is not alone determined by the
number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but the
convincing character of the testimony weighed by the impartial
minds of the jury.
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